Heideggers Denken wird in den letzten Jahren von der sogenannten Tierphilosophie mit dem Vorwurf attackiert, es lasse dem animalischen Leben keinen Raum, ja entwerte es sogar. Die vorliegende Studie nimmt Heideggers gesamtes OEuvre in den Blick, um einen diametral entgegengesetzten Entwurf zu präsentieren. Hierzu wird die von Heidegger beanspruchte Differenz zwischen Mensch und Tier im Bezugssystem der ontologischen Differenz verortet und ausgelegt. Auf diese Weise lässt sich zeigen, dass sich Tiere von Menschen nicht unterscheiden, weil ihnen etwas fehlen würde, sondern (...) weil ihnen eine grundsätzlich andere Seinsweise eignet. Ausgehend von dieser Feststellung widmet sich die Autorin der Erkundung der Seinsweise des Lebens und zeigt auf, dass sich mit Heidegger über das Lebendige sprechen lässt, ohne es zu degradieren oder - was im gleichen Maße verfehlt wäre - es einer romantisierenden Verherrlichung zu unterziehen. Das Ergebnis ist ein Zugang zum tierischen Leben, der seiner Andersheit Rechnung trägt. In recent years, Heidegger's thought has been attacked by so-called animal philosophy with the accusation that it leaves no room for animal life, and even devalues it. The present study takes a look at Heidegger's entire work in order to present a diametrically opposed design. For this purpose, the difference Heidegger claims to exist between man and animal is located and interpreted within the frame of reference of ontological difference. In this way, it can be shown that animals do not differ from humans because they lack something, but because they are endowed with a fundamentally different mode of being. Starting from this observation, the author devotes herself to exploring the mode of being that is "life" and shows that with Heidegger it is possible to speak about the living without degrading it or - which would be equally mistaken - subjecting it to a romanticizing glorification. The result is an approach to animal life that takes its otherness into account. (shrink)

Die Frage nach dem Sinn des Begriffes des »Vorprädikativen« wurde innerhalb der Heideggerforschung bislang nur marginal behandelt. Dabei geht es um einen Schlüsselbegriff, der Heideggers gesamtes Denken, von den frühen Vorlesungen bis zu seinem Spätwerk, durchzieht. Die Beiträge des vorliegenden Sammelbandes gehen den vielfältigen Dimensionen des Vorprädikativen nach und untersuchen sie im Zusammenhang mit wichtigen Themen der Philosophie Heideggers.

In this article, I contend that Franco Basaglia’s work of reform in psychiatry can be read as a proposal for an affirmative biopolitical psychiatry. My claim is that Basaglia’s reform is to be regarded not only as a successful dismantling of the old disciplinary psychiatry but also as an ante litteram attempt at preventing what Pierangelo Di Vittorio refers to as a “biopolitical psychiatry.” Di Vittorio’s definition is notably limited, for he seems to overlook Foucault’s conceptual oscillations between affirmative biopolitics (...) and negative biopower. Di Vittorio’s biopolitical psychiatry does not bear any affirmative connotation, and his radically negative perspective should rather be considered as the exertion of biopower in psychiatry, as a negative involution of an affirmative biopolitical psychiatry. I propose to read Basaglia’s entire work of reform, which can be summarised by his famous motto “bracketing mental illness” – that is, disregarding the patient’s diagnosis – as an affirmative biopolitical psychiatry. I suggest that biopolitical psychiatry cannot be understood only in negative terms, as Di Vittorio does, and that Basaglia did not propose to oppose its emergence; rather, he actively fought against disciplinary psychiatry. Basaglia’s reform does not prevent psychiatry from being one of the dispositifs of biopolitics, that is, one of the possible means through which political power reaches the lives of people: for him, this prevention might be impossible or even undesirable. On the other hand, it would preclude psychiatry from becoming a dispositif of biopower, one that would ultimately bring life under such strict control that it would degenerate into a thanatopolitical implosion. (shrink)

A thriving literature has developed over logical and mathematical pluralism – i.e. the views that several rival logical and mathematical theories can be equally correct. These have unfortunately grown separate; instead, they both could gain a great deal by a closer interaction. Our aim is thus to present some novel forms of abstractionist mathematical pluralism which can be modeled on parallel ways of substantiating logical pluralism (also in connection with logical anti-exceptionalism). To do this, we start by discussing the Good (...) Company Problem for neo-logicists recently raised by Paolo Mancosu (2016), concerning the existence of rival abstractive definitions of cardinal number which are nonetheless equally able to reconstruct Peano Arithmetic. We survey Mancosu’s envisaged possible replies to this predicament, and suggest as a further path the adoption of some form of mathematical pluralism concerning abstraction principles. We then explore three possible ways of substantiating such pluralism—Conceptual Pluralism, Domain Pluralism, Pluralism about Criteria—showing how each of them can be related to analogous proposals in the philosophy of logic. We conclude by considering advantages, concerns, and theoretical ramifications for these varieties of mathematical pluralism. (shrink)

How many logics do logical pluralists adopt, or are allowed to adopt, or ought to adopt, in arguing for their view? These metatheoretical questions lurk behind much of the discussion on logical pluralism, and have a direct bearing on normative issues concerning the choice of a correct logic and the characterization of valid reasoning. Still, they commonly receive just swift answers – if any. Our aim is to tackle these questions head on, by clarifying the range of possibilities that logical (...) pluralists have at their disposal when it comes to the metatheory of their position, and by spelling out which routes are advisable. We explore ramifications of all relevant responses to our question: no logic, a single logic, more than one logic. In the end, we express skepticism that any proposed answer is viable. This threatens the coherence of current and future versions of logical pluralism. (shrink)

Though it is well known that Hume composed his Treatise and the first version of his essay On Miracles during his stay in La Flèche, this fact has not received the attention it surely deserves. What may have induced a gentleman from Edinburgh to bury himself in the library of a Jesuit college? While every historian of early modern philosophy is quick to credit La Flèche with having provided Descartes’s education, Burton’s amazement that Hume himself never alludes to this unique (...) circumstance is still suggestive. I shall argue that what attracted Hume’s attention were the scholastic items contained in every good Jesuit library. (shrink)

German MS. 2 is a previously unstudied armorial dating from the mid-sixteenth century. This article shows that it was produced in the workshop of Lucas Cranach the Younger for Elector August of Saxony, and that it was copied from an earlier armorial of c.1500 which was kept in Cranach’s workshop, probably as reference material. Much of the original content and structure of this ‘old armorial’ has been preserved in Rylands German 2. On this basis, the original armorial can be located (...) in a late fifteenth-century Upper German tradition of armorial manuscripts known as the ‘Bodensee’ group. It was also closely linked to the Habsburg dynasty, and appears to have been dedicated to Empress Bianca Maria Sforza. The armorial therefore opens significant new perspectives on the relationships between artists and heraldry and between women and heraldic knowledge, and on ways of visualising the Holy Roman Empire through heraldry. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:Cardinal Sforza Pallavicino, SJ (1607–67), conceived a procedure for determining natural moral laws by voting under a veil of ignorance. Behind this veil, imagined possible people who are ignorant of their social position, personal characteristics, nation, and the historical period in which they live vote as equals. These possible people are asked to establish a moral law in pursuit of their own and collective happiness, which they are obligated by God to follow. This article discusses Pallavicino's innovative approach to (...) natural law and examines its reception in Southern Germany and (what is now) Austria. (shrink)